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THE PLACE OF TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES:
CoNSTITUTIONAL V1c1NAGE AND VENUE

William Wirt Blume*

I

N 1909 one Henry G. Connor, presumably Mr. Justice Connor of
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, published in the Pennsylvania Law Review an article entitled "The Constitutional Right to a
Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage." 1 The question discussed was: May a
state constitutionally provide by statute that a crime be tried in a
county other than that in which it was committed? Or, putting the
question in terms of vicinage as distinguished from venue, may a state
constitutionally provide by statute that a crime be tried by jurors summoned from a county other than the county of the crime? Concentrating his attention on the constitutions which guarantee trial by jury
without making any express reference to vicinage o.r venue, Mr. Justice
Connor remarked that the "question of legislative power is an open
one in our jurisprudence." He concluded that the "trend of judicial
thought" is toward a denial of the power. Since Mr. Justice Connor
wrote in I 909 a number of cases have been decided which clearly indicate that the present "trend of judicial thought" is the other way.
These decisions call for a re-examination of the entire problem.

I
THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION-H1sToR1cAL BACKGROUND

The distinction in modern law between vicinage and venue is aptly
illustrated by the following provisions of the Federal Constitution:
Article 3, Section 2: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held
in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."
Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law."

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ei.
1

Connor, "The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage," 57

UNIV. PA. L. REV. 197 (1909).
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Article 3 contains a simple provision for venue. The Sixth Amendment preservbs one of the oldest institutions of the common law-the
jury of the vicinage. Venue in modern law means the place of trial.
Vicinage means, not the place of trial, but the place from which the
jury must be summoned. Through centuries of development the pattern of progress has been from vicinage to venue.
A. Early English Practice and Statutes

When Coke wrote in the early 16oo's, it was still important to know
"out of what neighborhood" ( de quo vicineto) the jury should come,
the general rule being that it should come from the town, parish, or
hamlet "within which _the matter of fact issuabfe is alledged." 2 In order
to comply with this rule the sheriff had to summon the jurors or some
of them from the hundred in which the vicinage was located.8 According to Blackstone,4 the number of hundredors required for civil cases
was for a time six, then four, then six (statute of 1543), then two
(statute of 1585), and finally none (statute of 1705). Hale wrote
that four hundredors were required for criminal cases, but remarked
that he had never known of "any challenge for default of hundreders
upon a trial of an indictment for felony or treason." 5 After the requirement of hundredors had disappeared, that is after 1705, the jury was
summoned "de corpore comitatus, from the body of the county at large,
and not de vicineto, or from the particular neighborhood." 6
The gradual decline in the use of hundredors clearly reflected the
change that was taking place in jury trials. From. a period in which
jurors were required, or at least presumed, to know the facts of their
own knowledge," we move step by step to a period in which they were
supposed to obtain their knowledge only from evidence produced in
open court.8 By 1764 Lord Mansfield was able to say: "A juror should
be ~s white Paper, and know neither Plai'ntiff nor Defendant, but judge
2

1 CoKE oN LITTLETON 125 (1832).
3 BLACKSTO~E, COMMENTARIES 359 (1756).
4, Id. 360.
5 2 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 272 (1847).,
6
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 360 (1756). ·
7. PLUCKNETr, A CoNcISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw, 2d ed., 120 (1936).
8
' '• • • In 1468 Fortescue gives us a picture of a jury trial which is to all intents
and purposes in modern form •. By this date he is able to regard the jury as a body of
impartial men who come into court with an open mind; instead of finding the verdict
out of their own knowledge of the events, the parties or their counsel in open court
present their evidence to the jury." PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAW, 2d ed., 120-121 (1936).
8
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the Issue merely as an abstract Proposition, upon the Evidence produced before him." 9
So long as jurors were expected to decide cases from their own
knowledge or from information furnished by some of their own number, it was, of course, impossible for the jurors of one county to try a
crime committed in another county or outside the country. For the
same reason, grand jurors sworn to inquire only for the body of a
county (pro corpore comitatus) could not investigate events which had
occurred outside that county.10
Some of the difficulties which arose because of the requirement that
jurors decide facts from their own knowledge were vividly described
by Coke: 11

"If two of the king's subjects goe over into a forain realm and
fight there, and the one kill the other, this murder being done out
of the realm, cannot be for want of· triall heard and determined
before the common law....
"If A. give B. a mortal wound in a forain country, B. commeth
· in to England and dieth: this cannot be tried by the common law,
because the stroak was given there, where no visne can come...•
"If a man be strucken upon the high sea, and dieth of the
same stroke upon the land, this cannot be inquired of by the common law, because no visne can come from the place, where the
stroke was given. • • •
"And before the making of the statute of 2 E. 6. if a man had
been feloniously stricken, or poisoned in one county, and after had
died in another county, no sufficient indictment could thereof have
been taken in either of the said counties, because by the law of the
realm, the jurors of one county could not inquire of that, which
was done in an other county-"
These difficulties were real, and it was only after the practice of introducing evidence in open court had become general that relaxation by
act of Parliament was possible.
.
The statute referred to by Coke was passed in 1548. After reciting
that jurors could not under the common law "take knowledge" of
events which occurred in other counties, Parliament enacted that·where
a person should be "feloniously stricken or poisoned in one county, and
die of the same stroke or poison in another county," an indictment
might be found and an appeal brought in the county where the death
Mylock v. Saladine, I Wm: Blackstone Rep. 480 at 481 (1781).
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 303 (1756).
11
3 CoxE, INSTITUTES 48 (1797).
11

lO
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occurred. Other venue statutes enacted in England prior to the American Revolution should be noted:
26 Hen. VIII, c. 6 (1534): Persons accused of committing murder,
counterfeiting, and other crimes in Wales may be indicted and tried by
juries of adjoining Englisli counties.
, •
26 Hen. VIII, c. I3 ( 1534): Treasons committed ~ut of the realm
"shall be enquired of and presented by the oaths of twelve good and
_lawful men, upon good and probable evidence and witness, in such
shire and county of this realm, and before such persons as it shall please
the King's highness to appoint."
3 3 Hen. VIII, c. 2 3 ( I 541) : Treasons and murders committed
within or without the King's dominions may be tried in any county
designated by the King's commission of oyer and terminer and no
challenge for "shire or county" shall be allowed.
35 Hen. VIII,-c. 2 (1543): Treasons committed outside the realm
shall be heard and determined by "good and lawful men" of the shire
in which the King's Bench shall sit, or "before such commissioners, and
in such shire of the realm, as shall be assigned by the King's majesty's
commission."
5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. II (1552): Treasons committed outside the
realm <tshall be enquired and presented by the oaths of xii. good and
lawful men, upon good and probable evidence and witness, in such
shire and county of this realm, and before such persons, as it shall please
the King .... to appoint."
IO & I I Wm. III, c. 25 (1699): All murders, robberies, and other
felonies committed in Newfoundland "shall and may be enquired of
tried, heard, determined and adjudged in any shire or county of this
kingdom of England, by virtue of the King's commission."
9 Geo. I, c. 2 2 ( 1722): Certain cri~es committed by persons disguised (faces blacked) "shall and may be enquired of, examined, tried
and determined in any county" of England "in such manner and form,
as if the fact had been therein committed."
2 Geo. II, c. 2 I ( 1729): If a person be "felo,q,iously stricken or
poisoned" upon the sea or at any place out of England and die in England, or be "feloniously stricken or poisoned" in England and die upon
the sea or at any place out of England, his assailant may be indicted
and tried in the county in which such "death, stroke or poisoning shall
happen."
8 Geo. II, c. 20 (1735): Persons charged with the malicious destruction of turnpikes and works upon navigable rivers may be indicted
and tried in any adjacent county so that a "better and more impartial
trial" may be had.
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26 Geo. II, c_. I9 (1753): Persons charged with breaking or theft
from stranded or wrecked ships may be prosecuted "either in the county
where the fact shall be committed, or in any county next adjoining ...
and if the fact be committed in Wales, then the prosecution shall or
may be carried on in the next adjoining English county."
I 2 Geo. III, c. 2 4 ( 1772): Persons charged with destroying, "in
any place out of this realm," the King's dock yards, magazines, ships,
ammunition, and stores may be indicted and tried "either in any shire
or county within this realm" or "in such island, country, or place,
where such offense shall have been actually committed."
I 3 Geo. Ill, c. 63 ( 1773): Certain officers and judges stationed in
India accused of committing crimes in India may be tried by the court
of King's Bench in England. Transcripts of testimony taken in India
shall be admitted in evidence.
I4 Geo. Ill, c. 39 (1774): A person accused of murder or other
capital offense in Massachusetts Bay may be tried in an adjoining
province or in England if it shall appear to the governor that such
person was engaged in suppressing riots or enforcing the revenue laws
and "an indifferent trial cannot be had within the said provin,ce."
Reasonable expenses of witnesses shall be paid by the collector of customs.
B. Colonial Experience

On December 15, 1768, the House of Lords adopted resolutions
condemning certain acts of the people of Massachusetts Bay and declaring that some of these acts were "daring insults offered to his
Majesty's authority, and audacious usurpations of the powers of government." At the same time the House of Lords approved an address
to the King which recommended:
"that you will be graciously pleased to direct your Majesty's
governor of Massachusetts Bay to take the most effectual methods
for procuring the fullest information that can be obtained touching
all treason, or misprision of treason, committed within this government since the 30th day of December last, and to transmit the
same, together with the names of the persons who were most
active in the commission of such offences, to one of your Majesty's
principal secretaries of state, in order that your Majesty may issue
a special commission for enquiring of, hearing, and determining,
the said offences within this realm, pursuant to the provisions of the
statute of the 35th year of the reign of King Henry the eighth." 12
\

12

16
(1813).

HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES TO THE YEAR

1803, pp. 476-480
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After a "grand debate" the resolutions and address were approved by
the House of Commons, 169 to 65, January 26, 1769.18 Speakers opposed to the proposal that persons accused of treason in Massachusetts
be tried in England warned that such a measure would inflame the
American colonists and might lead to war.
The legislature of Virginia was in session when, in May 1769, it
received news of the action of Parliament.14 Resolutions, later known
as the Virginia Resolves, were at once, May 16, 1769, introduced and
passed. One of the "resolves" reads: 15
·

"Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Committee, that all
Trials for Treason, Misprison of Treason, or for any Felony or
Crime whatsoever,committed and done in this his Majesty's said
Colony and Dominion, by any Person or Persons residing therein,
ought of Right to be had, and conducted in and before his Majesty's Courts, held within the said Colony, according to the fixed and
known Course of Proceeding; and that the seizing any Person or
Persons, residing in this Colony, suspected of any Crime whatsoever, committed therein, and sending such Person, or Persons, to
Places beyond the Sea, to be tried, is highly derogatory of the
Rights of British subjects; as thereby the inestimable Privilege
of being tried by a Jury from the Vicinage, as well as the Liberty
of summoning and producing Witnesses on such Trial,' will be
taken away from the Party accused-"
On the next day, May 17, 1769, an address to the King, containing
the following language was passed:
"When we consider, that by the established Laws and Constitution of this Colony, the most ample Provision is made for
apprehending and punishing all those who shall dare to engage in •
any treasonable Practices ·against your Majesty, or disturb the
Tranquility of Government, we cannot, without Horror, think of
the new, unusual, and perrp.it us, with all Humility, to add, unconstitutional and illegal Mode, recommended to your Majesty,
of seizing and carrying beyond Sea, the Inhabitants of America,
suspected of any Crime; and of trying such Persons in any other
Manner than by the ancient and long established Course of Pro:ceeding: For, how truly deplorable must be the Case of a wretched
18
Id. 485-510. See quotations from Hansard, Trevelyan, and Lecky in Connor,
"The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage," 57 UNIV. PA. L.
REV. 197 at 205-208 (1909).
\
'
' 14 VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 303 (1922).
15
JouRNALS OF THE HousE OF BURGESSES, 1766-1769, Kennedy ed., 214

(1906).

.
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American, who, having incurred the Displeasure of any one in
Power, is dragged from his native Home, and his dearest domestick Connections, thrown into Prison, not to await his Trial before
a Court, Jury, or Judges, from a Knowledge of whom he is encouraged to hope for speedy Justice; but to exchange his Imprisonment in his own Country, for Fetters amongst Strangers?
Conveyed to a distant Land, where no Friend, no Relation, will
alleviate his Distresses, or minister to his Necessities; and where
no Witness can be found to testify his Innocence; shunned by the
reputable and honest, and consigned to the Society and Converse
of the wretched and the abandoned; he can only pray that he may
soon end his Misery with his life." 16
The fact that the Virginia Resolves were promptly approved by
the assemblies of the other American colonies 11 demonstrates that the
minority group in Parliament was fully justified in warning that the
revival of the statute of 35 Henry VIII would inflame the American
colonists and might lead to war.
In 1774 the first Continental Congress declared:
"That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law
of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according
to the course of that law....
"That the following acts of Parliament are infringements and
violations of the rights of the colonists....
"Also the 12 Geo. 3, ch. 24, entitled 'An act for the better
preserving his Majesty's dock-yards, magazines, ships, ammunition, and stores,' which declares a new offense in America, and
deprives the American subject of a constitutional trial by jury of
the vicinage, by authorizing the trial of any person charged with
the committing of any offense described in the said act, out of the
realm, to be indicted and tried for the same in any shire or county
within the realm." 18
Without sketching further the historical background of the vicinage
and venue provisions of the Federal· Constitution, it may be asserted with confidence that the term "vicinage" as used by the colonists
in their struggle with England did not refer to the neighborhood of the
crime or even to the county in which the crime was alleged to have
16

ld.

11

I CAMBRIDGE H1sToRY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

215-216.

668 (1929). Also see
304 (1922).
2d Commager ed., 83-84 (1940).

TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
18

DocUMENTS OF AMERICAN H1sToRY,

VAN
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been committed. By insisting on a right to a jury of the vicinage the
colonists hoped to escape the hardship and danger of standing trial in
some distant colony or in England. In the Declaration of Independence
the King was condemned, not for interfering with the jury of the
vicinage as known to Coke, but "for transporting us beyond Seas to be
tried for pretended offences." 19

C. Federal Bill of Rights and Judiciary Act
The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States
were proposed by Congress immediately after the passftge of the Judiciary Act of 1789.20 The word "district" as used in the Sixth Amendment no doubt referred to the judicial districts established by the act.
Under the act, state and district boundaries coincided except in the cases
of Massachusetts and Virginia. Each of these states was divided into
two judicial districts. The area of a district being, in most instances,
the area of a state, the term "district" clearly had no reference to counties. Although the Sixth Amendment preserved the jury of the vicinage, it greatly enlarged the area from which the jury might be selected.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that a capital cr~me be prosecuted in the county of the crime, or, if that could not be done "without
great inconvenience," at least twelve jurors should be summoned from
that county.21 Jurors for other cases were to be summoned "from such
parts of the district" as the court might direct. Trial within the state
or federal district was, in view of colonial experience, of sufficient importance to be guaranteed by the Constitution. Trial within the county
of the crime was not of this importance. Whether the trial should take
place in that or in some other county was a matter for Congress to
decide.
19

Id. at IO I.
Stat. L. 73, approved September 24, l 789. The first ten amendments were
proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789. l AMERICAN CHARTERS, CoNSTITUTI0NS AND ORGANIC LAWS, Thorpe ed., 32 (1909). They were finally ratified December 15, 1791. Id. at 33.
21
1 Stat. L. 73 at 88 (1789). The second alternative of this provision was re.pealed in 1862. 12 Stat. L. 588 (1862). At the time the provision was adopted
attempts were made "to require, imperatively, that Federal juries should be drawn
from the county in which the offense was committed." Warren, "New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 106 (1923).
According to Warren, these attempts were defeated for the reason stated by Madison,
that attempts to place a similar provision -in the Constitution had failed: "The truth
is that in most of the States, the practice is different, and hence the· irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject. In some States, jurors are drawn from the whole body
of the community indiscriminately; in others, from larger districts-comprehending a
number of counties, and in a few only from a single county." Id .. at 106.
29 l
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The Constitution of the United States having established vicinages
of the larger type ( states and judicial districts) a question arose as to
whether Congress had power to direct that jurors be returned from a
subdivision of a vicinage. In I 890 a federal district judge expressed
the view that under the Sixth Amendment a jury for a criminal prosecution "must be drawn from the whole district, and not from any division of it." 22 This view was challenged immediately 23 and has received
little or no support. The settled authority. is the other way.u In view
of the fact that Congress has subdivided "districts" into "divisions;" a
further question may arise as to whether the trial must be had in the
"division" in which the crime was committed. While Congress may so
direct, the Sixth Amendment does not require that this be done.25 So
long as a "division" is really a "division" and not a "district" by another name, it is a venue established by Congress, not a vicinage fixed
by the Constitution.

II
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE ORIGINAL STATES

Before attempting to survey the vicinage and venue provisions of
the constitutions of all the states, it is important, historically, to consider the vicinage and venue provisions of the constitutions of the
original states, many of which were adopted prior to I 800. These early
provisions were products of the body of thought which produced the
Federal Constitution and together with the provisions of that instrument established the patterns of language used in the later constitutions.
The present writer believes and will undertake to show: (I) That
in the period of the first constitutions, that is, prior to I 800, a jury of
the county or other small vicinage was not generally thought to be of
sufficient importance to have constitutional protection. ( 2) That the
indefinite vicinage provisions found in some of the early constitutions
were intended to guard against transportation out of the state or to
some distant place for trial. (3) That the writers of a great majority
of the later constitutions, in copying these early provisions, misunderUnited States v. Dixon, (D.C. Cal. 1890) 44 F. 401 at 402.
United States v. Wan Lee, (D.C. Wash. 1890) 44 F. 707.
24
United States v. Ayres, (D.C. S.D. 1891) 46 F. 651; United States v.
Peuschel, (D.C. Cal. 1902) 116 F. 642; Spencer v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1909)
169 F. 562; Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 38 S. Ct. 168 (1917);
Seadlund v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 742.
25
Clement v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1906) 149 F. 305,; McNealy v.
Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 280.
22

23
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stood them and made definite that which purposely had been left indefinite.
The absence of a vicinage or venue provision being a matter of
considerable significance, constitutions omitting such provision will also
be noted.

A. Maryland, Massachusetts and New H arnp_shire
The first constitution of Maryland ( r776) 26 declared that "the
trial of facts where they arise, 1s one of the greatest securities of the
lives, liberties and estat~ of_ the people.'" A similar declaration, limited
to criminal cases, will be found in the Massachusetts constitution of
r780 27 a1;1d in the New Hampshire constitution of 1784.28 In tp.e latter
state the constitution further declared "that no crime or offense ought
to be tried in any other county than that in which it is committed."
These several declarations still appear in the constitutions of these
states.29
Although in form an admonition ("no crime or offense ought to
be tried"), the New Hampshire provision stands as a limitation on
legislative power.80 Discussing the provision in r88r, Justice Smith,
speaking for the state supreme court, said: 81
" ... The object of the framers of the constitution, as already
remarked, was to protect the subject against an unfair trial at a
distance from the vicinity of the alleged crime and at a place selected by officials who might be hostile to the accused. . . . Men .
who had enjoyed this protection under the British crown would
not be likely to surrender it after engaging in an exhaustive war
for seven years to establish their independence. One of their
grievances was the trampling tinder foot of the time-honored principle that trials for crime must be by a jury of the vicinage."
The Massachusetts provision was relied on in r 824 in an a,ttack on
a statute which provided that a prosecution for murder might be conducted in the county where the victim had died. 82 Att~ntion was called
to the part of the New Hampshire provision which required that crimes
26

Md. Const. (1776), Declaration of Rights, art. 18.
Mass. Const. (1780), Part First, art. 13.
28
N. H. Const. (1784), art. i, § 17. ·
29 Md. Const. (1867), Declaration of Rights, art. 20; Mass. Const. (1780) Part
First, art. 13; N. H. Const. (1792), Part First, art. 17.
so State v. Albee, 61 N. H. 423 (1881).
!11 Id., 61 N. H. at 427-428.
32
Coml})onwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 549 (1824).
27
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be tried in the county where committed. Chief Justice Parker, delivering the opinion of the state supreme court, said: 38
" •.. the word vicinity is not technical, with a precise legal
meaning, as the word county or the ancient word visne, vicinage,
would be held to be.
" ... The form in which the principle is expressed is also worthy
of consideration. It is not prohibitory of a trial of an offence, in
any other county than that in which it happened; nor is it a:ffirma-•
tive of a right in the citizen to be tried in any particular county.
It is merely declaratory of the sense of the people, that the proof
of facts in criminal prosecutions should be in the vicinity or neighborhood where they happen."
In support of his conclusion that the writers of the constitution did not
intend to "tie the hands of the legislature" in the matter of venue, the
chief justice pointed out that they were well acquainted with the English venue statutes and must have known also "that the principle of
the common law limiting the trials of crimes to the county within which
they were committed, had been necessarily departed from by our ancestors in the early history of the country." After citing certain colonial
statutes which had authorized the trial of criminal cases in counties
other than where the crimes were committed, the chief justice continued: 8i
" ... This being the state of things at the time of the adoption
of the constitution ... it may wel) be supposed that the wise men
who framed the declaration of rights, when they proposed to the
people to declare, that 'in criminal trials, the verification of facts
in the vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities
of the life, liberty and property of the citizen,' intended to hold
out a caution to all future legislatures to regard this principle, in
their laws concerning crimes and punishments, but not to prohibit
them from causing trials to be had in adjoining counties where
the public interest should demand it."
. In Maryland there has been a surprising absence of judicial consideration of the vicinage declaration of the constitution of that state.
Insofar as the writer has been able to discover, the Maryland Court of
Appeals has never been called upon to declare a statute unconstitutional
on the ground that it authorized the trial of a crime in a county other
than where committed. While there are only a few statutes of this
38
Si

Id. at 552.
Id at 554.

70
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character in force, at least two of them ;re similar to statutes which
have been held unconstitutional in other states.35 If the validity of one
of these statutes should ever be questioned, it seems improbable that
the court of appeals will find in the vague declaration of the constitution a limitation on legislative power.

B. Virginia and Pennsylvania
·) The first constitution of Virginia, adopted in June r776, provided
that "in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to ... a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage." 36 The
first constitution of Pennsylvania, adopted later in the same year
(r776), provided that "in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man
hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the
country." 37 In I 790 the word "country" was changed to "vicinage." 38
The Virginia Bill of Rights was drafted by George Mason,39 the
same George Mason who had drawn up the Virginia Resolves of
r769,40 and it is reasonable to suppose that the word "vicinage" was
intended to have the same meaning in both documents.. The vicinage
referred to in the resolves was the entire colony-not some particular
place within the colony. According to the resolves, persons "residing''
in the colony ought to be tried before courts held "within the said
colony."
It should be noted that, under the constitution, the accused has a
right to a jury of "his" vicinage. A convict's vicinage, according to the
Md. Code Ann. (1939) art. 27, § 631: "Any person who may commit any
indictable offense on a steamboat or train within the State of Maryland may be presented, indicted, tried and convicted in any county or city from, to or through which
the said boat or train may run •.." § 632: "Any person who may commit any crimes,
felony or misdemeanor, on or at the boundary or divisional line between any of the
counties in this State, or so near thereto or where the exact location of such boundary
is so uncertain as to render it doubtful in which county the offense was committed,
then the county which first assumes jurisdiction ... shall have jurisdiction to charge,
present, indict, try, convict and sentence. . . ." A statute similar to § 63 l was held
·unconstitutional in People v. Brock, 149 Mich. 464, II2 N. W. lII6 (1907). Discussions of statutes similar to§ 632 will be found in note by M.A.G. in 25 ILL. L. REv.
732 (1931) and one by A.B.S. in 76 A.L.R. 1034 at 1040 (1932).
86
Va. Const. (1776), Bill of Rights, § 8.
37
Pa. Const. ( l 776), Declaration of Rights, §
38
Pa. Const. ( l 790), art. 9, § 9. Something of the history of this change will
· be found in State v. Brown, 103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579 (1931).
39
DocUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 2d Commager ed., 103 (1940).
40
VAN TYNE, THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 303 (1922). A
portion of the text of the Resolves appears supra at note 19:
35

9.
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opinion in Ruffin's Case,4 1 is the penitentiary, not the county of the
cnme.
In 1919 Judge Prentis, after stating that "the true construction of
the word vicinage as used in the Constitution is that it corresponds with
the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the venue of the crime
is laid," referred to Ruffin's Case as follows: 42
"In Ruffin's Case this court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which had been attacked on this ground, where a convict
who had committed a crime in the county of Bath was tried in the
Circuit Court of the city of Richmond, basing its ruling upon the
fact that he was a convict in the penitentiary, under the control and
subject to the laws which governed that institution and its inmates."

In 1920 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld, as constitutional, a statute passed in 1860 which provided that a crime committed
on the boundary of two eounties, or within five hundred yards of such
boundary, might be tried in either of said counties.48 The defendant
contended that the statute violated provisions of the state constitution
which guaranteed trial by jury "as heretofore" and trial by a "jury of
the vicinage." In overruling these contentions, Chief Justice Brown
said: 44
" ... The primary and literal meaning of vicinage is neighborhood or vicinity, but neither of these terms definitely indicates just
what territory it embraces.... A county, on the other hand, is a
definitely designated territory.... With the measurably vague
and indefinite meaning of vicinage as applied to the territory from
which jurors are to be summoned to inquire into offenses com-_
mitted along the boundary line of two counties, and with uncertainty as to which side of the line was the scene of the crime, the
legislature, in the passage of the forty-eighth section Qf the Act
of March 3 r, r 860, merely defined what should be regarded as
· the vicinage . . . and there is nothing in our Constitution forbidding the legislature from so fixing it. ·
" ... If the framers of our Constitution had intended that trial
of a crime should be before a jury of the county in which it was
committed, they, too, would have used that definite word instead
of vicinage, of indefinite meaning."
41

62 Va. (21 Grat.) 790 (1871).
Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S. E. 562 (1919).
48
Commonwealth v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, II0 A. 738 (1920).
44
Id., 268 Pa. at 300-302.
"
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In 1936 the court held that it might order a change of venue on
the state's application without violating the vicinage provision of the
state constit)-ltion.45 Delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice
Kephart pointed out that the I 920 case had "clearly established" that
vicinage "is not co-terminus with a county and may, in fact, embrace
more than one county." 46 As a consequence of this decision the legislature, in 1938, provided that venue might be changed "on application
of the defendant or defendants only, and not on application of the
Commonwealth or the prosecutor." 47 The passage of this statute,
alth'ough of doubtful w:isdom,48 emphasizes the fact that venue in
Pennsylvania is not regulated by the constitution, but by common law ·
and by statute.
C. South Carolina and Georgia
The :first constitution of South Carolina (1776) branded as oppressive and unconstitutional English statutes under which a person was
"liable to be sent to and tried in Great Britain for an ·offence ••. committed in the colonies." 49 The second constitution (1778) declared
that "no freeman of this State be taken o~ imprisoned·... but by.. the
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." 50 No reference was
made in either constitution to vicinage or venue. In 1895, not in the
bill of rights but in an article dealing with "jurisprudence," the constitution directed the legislature to provide for change of venue, and
then declared: "Unless a change of. venue be had under the provisions /
of this article the defendant shall be tried in the county where the
offense was committed." 51 The bill of rights merely provides that the
accused "shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury." 52
The :first constitution of Georgia (1777) provided that "All matters of breach of the peace, felony, murder, and treason against the
State" should be tried "in the county where the same was commit- ·
ted." 53 Similar provisions appear in the constitutions ?f 1789 H and
Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 A. 574 (1936) noted 25
L. J. 1036 (1937), and IO So. CAL. L. R:i,y. 506 (1937).
46
324 Pa. at 568.
47
Pa. Pamphlet Laws, 1938, No. 43, § l .
48
52 HARV. L. REV~ 1023 (1939).
49 S. C. Const. ( l 776), Preamble.
50 S. C. Const. (1778), art. 41.
51
S. C. Const. (1895), art. 6, §§ 1, 2.
52 Id., art. 1, § 18.
53
Ga. Const: (1777), art. 39·
54
Ga. Const. (1789), art. 3, § 4•
45
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1798.H The present Georgia provisions will not be found in the bill
of rights, but in article VI, which deals with the "judiciary." This
article sets forth in detail the venue of divorce cases, cases affecting
titles to land, equity cases, suits against joint obligors and trespassers,
suits against parties to negotiable instruments, and of civil and criminal
cases in general. The Georgia practice of placing all sorts of venue
provisions in the constitution is unique and has not been followed by
the constitution makers of other states.

D. New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, New York,
Connecticut and Rhode Island
The first constitutions of New Jersey (1776), Delaware (1776),
North Carolina (1776), New York (1777), Connecticut (1776) and
(1818), and Rhode Island (1842) do not refer in express terms to
either vicinage or venue. They do, however, guarantee trial by jury.
Any limitation on the power of the legislature to fix the place of trial
of criminal cases must be found in this guaranty or in some other
similar provis1on.
'
In 1880 the New York Court of Appeals upheld as valid a statute
which provided that a person committing burglary and larceny in one
county and carrying the stolen property into another county, might be
indicted, tried, and convicted for burglary in the latter county. 56 It was
argued that this statute was in conflict with the provision of the constitution which declared that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless on presentment or indictment
of a grand jury." 57 The court, speaking through Folger, Chief Justice,
said: 58
"By all rules of interpretation, then, we are to read the language of the bill of rights in the light of the law as it was when
the bill of rights was adopted. Then, though as a rule indictments
could be preferred and tried only in the county where the offense
was committed, there were exceptions to that rule of instances in
which the legislature had directed otherwise. And the bill of
rights must be taken to have recognized that legislative power,
and not to have intended the abrogation of it, as there is no indication in the language of a purpose so to do."
Relying on this opinion, the New York Supreme Court, at special term
in 1919, upheld a statute providing that an indictment for bigamy may
Ga. Const. (1798), art. 3, § 1.
Mack v. People, 82 N. Y. 235 (1880).
57
N. Y. Const. (1846) § 6.
58
Mack v. People, 82 N. Y. 235 at 238 (1880).
55

56
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be found in the county in which the defendant is arrested. 59 In 1938
the County Court of Queens County pointed out that, in New York,
the rule that criminal offenses must be prosecuted in the cqunties where
committed, "was not the subject of constitutional decree but obtained
as a common-law rule of procedure." 60
A statute of North Carolina enacted in 1893 provided that the
superior court of "any county which adjoins the county in which the
crime of lynching shall be committed shall have full and complete
jurisdiction over the crime and the offender to the same extent as if the
crime had been committed in the bounds of such adjoining county." 61
This statute was challenged as unconstitutional in 1906 on the ground
that the legislature had no power to change the common-law rule which
required that a person be indicted and tried in the county of the
crime.62 The constitution of North Carolina did not contain an express
provision relative to venue, but did guarantee trial by jury and immunity from criminal prosecutions exc~pt by "indictment, pr~sentment
or impeachment." 63 In answer to this challenge, Chief Justice Clark,
speaking for the state supreme-court, said: 64
''When the Constitution uses the words 'jury' and 'grand jury'
they are interpreted_ as being the same bodies, which were known
and well recognized when the Constitution was adopted."
Upon investigating the situation which existed when the constitution
was first adopted in 1776, the court found: 65
"Up to 1739, indictments for offenses occurring anywhere in
North Carolina were cognizable by a grand jury sitting in Chowan
County, at Edenton. In that year the venue was changed to New
Bern. From 1746 to 1806-for sixty years-indictments were
found in districts courts, though the grand jury did not sit in the
county where the offense was committed, unless that happened to
be the county in which the Court was held, and this is the case still
with all indictments in the Federal Courts."
Referring to the early English venue statutes the court noted many
statutory exceptions to the rule that a person must be indicted and tried
59

People ex rel. Mayo v. Hanley, 109 Misc. 591, 180 N.Y.S. 342 (1919).
People v. Vario, 165 Misc. 842, 2 N.Y.S. (2d) 61 l at 615 (1938).
61
N. C. Code (1935), § 4600.
.
62 State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 492, 55 S. E. 600 (1906).
63
N. C. Const. (1876) § 12.
64 State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 492 at 495, 55 S. E. 600 ( l 906).
65
Id., 142 N. C. at 498.
60
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in the county of the crime. Apparently approving Stephen's theory of
venue, the court quoted from his History of the Criminal Law of England as follows:
"A rule which requires eighteen statutory exceptions, and such
an evasion as the one last mentioned in the case of theft-the commonest of all offences-is obviously indefensible. It is obvious
that all courts otherwise competent to try an offence should be
competent to try it irrespectively of the place where it was committed, the place of trial being determined by the convenience of
the court, the witnesses, and the person accused. Of course, as a
general rule, the county where the offence was committed would
be the most convenient place for the purpose." 66
After an examination of the English statutes, many of them enacted
long prior to American independence, the court concluded "that the
venue of offenses cognizable before any grand jury is a matter of legislative enactment." 67
In denying a right to a jury of the vicinage in a civil case, Chief
Justice Durfee, speaking for the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in
r 87 5, referred to an earlier unreported criminal case as follows: 68
"The right of trial in the vicinage was much debated in the
case of The State v. Thomas W. Dorr. Dorr was indicted and
tried in Newport County, instead of Providence County, under an
act authorizing indictments for certain offences in a county other
than that in which the offences were committed. The act however was passed previous to the adoption of the Constitution. Its
validity was sustained by this court."

In a note to this case a later chief justice wrote:
"The same matter was earlier considered in the case of The
State v. Joseph Joslin. Joslin was indicted in Newport County for
treason committed in Providence County.... The state, argues the
court, was originally a colony without counties; the division into
counties was the act of the legislature; when, therefore, the legislature authorized an indictment in any county, without regard to
the county where the offence was committed, it did nothing more
than modify laws which it had previously enacted. The opinion
further holds that a right of trial in the vicinage is not, at common law and under Magna Charta, an inseparable incident of the
right of trial by jury." 69
66 I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL

LAw oF ENGLAND 278 (1883).
State v. Lewis, 142 N.C. 492 at 499, 55 S. E. 600 (1906).
68
Taylor v. Gardiner, II R. I. 182 at 186 (1875).
69
Ibid.
67
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In the recent case of State v. Pace 10 the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared constitutional a statute which provides that any,person charged with the nonsupport of a wife, child, grandchild, parent,
or grandparent "may be prosecuted before any court of this state in
the same manner as if such offense had been committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of such court." Chief Justice Maltbie, speaking
for the court, said: 71
"Our constitution, unlike those of some states, contains no
provision restricting the place of trial of persons accused of crime.
. . . The right of one accused of crime to have a fair and impartial
trial has been the basis of Anglo-Saxon criminal jurisdiction ever
since Magna Carta. But that has never been regarded as involving
as a necessary-element the requirement that in all cases an accused
be tried within the. county or other territorial jurisdiction within
which the offense was committed."

E. Maine and Vermont
Although not "original" states, Maine and Vermont are in the
block of states formed from the colonies and have a legal background
similar to that of the original states.
The first constitution of Vermont (1777), after providing that "in
all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to ... a speedy
public trial, by an impartial jury of the country," declared that "no
person shall be liable to be transported out of this State for trial, for
any offence committed within this State." 12 Similar provisions appear
in the constitutions of 1786 and 1793. The constitution of Maine
( 1819) provides that persons accused of crime shall have a speedy,
public trial "by a jury of the vicinity." 78
In 1921 the Supreme Court of Maine sustained a statute which
conferred upon certain courts jurisdiction of offenses, under fish and
game laws, committed in adjoining counties.74 It was argued that the
word "vicinity" is equivalent to the word "county" and "was intended
to limit the trial of offenses to the county in which the crime was com- ·
mitted." 75 The court concluded that the framers of the constitution
used the word vicinity in its popular sense which is "near, not remote."
After referring to a number of statutes which, prior to 1820, had proState v. Pace, 129 Conn. 570, 29 A. (2d) 755 (1943).
Id., I 29 Conn. at 572.
72
Vt. Const. (1777), c. 1, §§ IO, 19.
78
·
Me. Const. (1819), art. 1, § 6.
74
State v. Longley, II9 Me. 535, II2 A. 260 (1921).
7
~ Id., II9 Me. at 538.
70

71
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vided for trials of crimes in counties other than where committed, the
court, speaking through Justice Morrill, said: 76
"Therefore, in view of this history of legislative proceedings
in Massachusetts prior to the separation, we think that the framers
of the Constitution of Maine did not use the word 'vicinity' as
meaning 'county'."

In 1931 the Supreme Court of Vermont was caIIed upon to decide
whether the word "country" used in the constitution of that state means
"county." After pointing out that the Vermont provision was "undoubtedly" borrowed from the first constitution of Pennsylvania,
Justice Slack, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"· .. The changing of the Pennsylvania constitution, and the history respecting it ... leaves no room for doubt that in that jurisdiction the word 'country' was deemed to embrace more territory
than the neighborhood, the visne, or the vicinage. We think such
was the understanding that led the framers of our Constitution to
use the word 'country' rather than one of more restricted meaning." 11
F. Summary and Comparison
Reviewing briefly the constitutions of the fifteen states mentioned
above, we find that in seven of these states the early constitutions contained no express reference to vicinage or venue; in four they required
a jury of "his" or "the" vicinage, vicinity, or country; in two they
merely declared it essential to verify facts where they arise; while in
two they provided in plain language that crimes be tried in the counties where committed.
Turning a moment from the early constitutions of the above fifteen
states to the present constitutions of the other thirty-three states,78 we
find a striking contrast. Twenty-six of these constitutions contain vicinage or venue provisions while only seven do not. Of the twenty-six,
twelve provide for a jury of the "county or district"; twelve provide
for a jury of the "county"; one providei:; for a jury of the "parish";
while only one (Kentucky) uses indefinite language, requiring a jury
of the "vicinage." It should be noted, by the way, that Kentucky's
first constitution was adopted in 1792.
The division of the forty-eight states into two geographical groups
76

Id., 119 Me. at 540.
State v. Brown, 103 Vt. 312 at 320, 154 A. 579 (1931). The word ncountrf'
appears in the address adopted by Virginia in I 769. Supra following note I 1.
78
Discussed in detail in subdivision III, infra.
77
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is justified by the simple fact that one group had colonial background.
and the other did not. In the states which had such a background the
constitution writers were fully aware of the English venue statutes,
some of which were in force in the colonies; they took into account
colonial statutes which authorized in certain situations the trial of
crimes in counties other than where committed; they were alert to the
dangers which would result from transportation out of the state or to
some distant place for trial. The same was true of the judges who
interpreted the constitutions in later years.
The problem of the early constitution writers was to guard against
the dangers of transportation without taking from the legislatures
power to regulate venue. within a state. The constitution of Vermont
seems to have expressed the prevailing view when it provided for trial
by jury of "the country" and then declared that no person should be
"transported out of the State" for trial for ah offense committed within
the state. In I 890 the vague provision of the Massachusetts constitution was thought to prevent punishment of a nonresident in Massachusetts for a crime committed wholly outside the state. 79

III
PROVISIONS OF PRESENT STATE CoNSTITUTIONS

All of the state constitutions now in force may be placed, with
respect to vicinage and venue, in four main groups: (A) No express
provision for vicinage or venue-13. (B) Indefinite vicinage or venue
provisions-7. (C) Provisions requiring trial by a jury of the "county
or district" in which the crime was committed-12. (D) Provisions
requiring trial in, or by a jury of, the "county" or "parish" in which
the crime was committed-I 6. There has been some shifting of states
from one class to another, but not very much. South Carolina, for instance, had no vicinage or venue provision until I 895; then required
trial in the "county." 80 Michigan's first constitution (18'35) required
, a jury of the "vicinage." 81 In I 850 this provision was taken out. 82 In
Missouri "vicinage" was changed to "county." 83 In Illinois the change
was from "vicinage" to "county or district." 84 In Louisiana the change
79

Bradley v. Burton, 151 Mass. 419, 24 N. E. 778 (1890).
See note 50, supra.
81 Mich. Const. (1835), art. I, § IO.
82 Mich. 'Const. ( I 8 50), art. 6, § 28 omits "of the vicinage."
88
Mo. Const. (1820), art. 13, § 9; Mo. Const. (1875) art. 2, § 22.
84
Ill. Const. (1818), art. 8, § 9; Ill. Const. (1870), art. 2, § 9.

80
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was from "vicinage" to "parish." 85 In Ohio, for another instance,
"county or district" was changed to "county." 86 In qne state (Utah)
"county or district" appears in the bill of rights, while "county" appears
elsewhere in the constitution. 87
•

A. No Express Provision
There are thirteen states which have no express constitutional provision for vicinage or venue.88 In our consideration of the constitutions
of the original states, we noted cases in New York, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island in which the courts held that immunity
from prosecution except by indictment or the right of trial by jury did
not include indictment and trial in, or by a jury of, the county where
the crime was committed. In these cases the courts recognized that the
common law made such a requirement, but held that the legislatures
have power to change the common law in this respect. In contrast with
these decisions we find, in the group of states not formed from the
colonies, two oft-cited cases in which the court held that the guaranty
of jury trial includes trial by jury of the county of the crime.
In People v. Powell 89 the Supreme Court of California struck
down, as unconstitutional, a statute which authorized a change of venue
from one county to another on application by the state. The court relied
heavily on Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and quoted at length
from his opinion in the Michigan case of Swart v. Kimball. 90 Recognizing that the first constitution of the state had no immediate legal background other than the Spanish civil law, Justice Works pointed out
that "its framers were, with few exceptions, from states where the common law prevails." 91
The decision in the above case was overruled by implication. by the
California Supreme Court in 1901 92 and ignored by a district court
La. Const. (1812), art. 6, § 18; La. Const. (1864), tit. 7, art. 105.
0hio Const. (1802), art. 8, § II; Ohio Const. (1851), art. 1, § 10, as
amended in 1912.
87
Utah Const. (1895), art. 1, § 12; art. 8, § 5.
88
California, Conecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Texas.
89
87 Cal. 348 1 25 P. 481 (1891).
90
43 Mich. 443, 5 N. W. 635 (1880).
91
People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348 at 356, 25 P. 481 (1891).
92
People v. Prather, 134 Cal. 386, 66 P. 483 (1901). The statute involved in
this case provided: "When property taken in one county by burglary, robbery, larceny,
or embezzlement, has been brought into another, the jurisdiction of the offense is in
either county." Quoted from id. at 386.
85

86

So
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of appeals in I9I2.98 The statute involved was repealed in r905.04
Commenting on the r9r2 decision Professor Kidd wrote:
"People v. Powell is probably overruled in California; and its
fallacies have been exposed _in other jurisdictions. It would seem,
however, thaf the principal case goes too ·far the other way in holding that 'under the constitution the place of.trial is subject to legislative determination'." 95

Swart v. Kimball 9 6 involved- a Michigan statute passed in I 8 57
providing that the crime of cutting trees on state lands might be prosecuted "in the county where the offense is committed; or, if it be committed in the upper peninsula, in any county in said peninsula; if in the
lower peninsula, i11- the county where the offense was committed, or in
such other county as the Commissioner of the State Land Office, or the
Attorney General, shall, by written instructions to the prosecuting attorney thereof, direct." 97 Justice Cooley, speaking for the Supreme
Court, declared: 98
"The act is not only tyrannical and oppressive in the last de_gree, and such as no legislature, even if its power was ample,
should ever have passed, but it is manifestly in conflict with one of
the plainest and most important provisions of the Constitution."
\

The line of reasoning by which Justice Cooley reached his conclusion
is fairly simple. The constitution of r850 declared that the "right of
trial by jury shall remain." What right? "The right as it existed
before; the right to a trial by· jury as it ha:d become known to the
previous jurisprudence of the state." 99 What features of jury trial are
preserved? All that are "substantial and beneficial," including the re_98 In re McDonald, 20 Cal. App. 641, 129 P. 957 (1912). The statute involved
in this case provided: "When the offense, either of bigamy or incest is committed in
one county and the defendant is apprehended in another, the jurisdiction is in either
county."
84 7 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 917-918 (1922).
.
95
I CAL. L. REv. 272 at 274 (1913). In Barry v. Truax, 13 N. D. 131 at
148, 99 N. W. 769 (1904), the Supreme Court of North Dakota referred to the
decision in People v. Powell as follows: "Its fallacy lies in erroneously assuming that
at common law the defendant had an unqualified right to a trial by a jury of the
county of the offense. The people of California, when they adopted their first constitution, did not enter into statehood from a territorial government, like the people
of this state."
96
•
43 Mich. 443, 5 N. W. 635 (1880).
'
97 Mich. Laws, 1857, No. 100, § 5 at p. 212; 2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1857) p.
15'60.
98 Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich. 443 at 448, 5 N. W. 635 (1880).
99 Id., 43 Mich. at 448.
.
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quirement that the jury in criminal cases must be of the county of the
crime.
In reaching his conclusion Justice Cooley assumed, that the jury
known "to the previous jurisprudence of the State" was a jury of the
county. The provision of the constitution of 1850, that "the right of
trial by jury shall remain," was continued from the first constitution,
hence speaks from 1835. The "previous jurisprudence of the State"
in the territorial period (1805-1836) was that established by the Federal Constitution and by Congress. Under the federal system vicinage
did not mean county, but state, or, what was practically the same in
extent, a federal judicial district. Not only did Justice Cooley fail to
consider the actual situation in the territorial period; he failed to note
that the phrase "of the vicinage" found in the Michigan constitution
of 1835 was dropped from the constitution in 1850.
In addition to his unwarranted assumption, Justice Cooley asserted
that the English venue statutes were "forbidden by the unwritten
constitution of England." 100 This assertion was accompanied by a reference to the statute of Henry VIII which authorized the trial in
England of treasons committed outside the realm, and the fact that
"the existence of such statutes with the threat to enforce them was one
of the grievances which led to the separation of the American colonies
from the British empire." No reference, however, was made to the
venue statutes of the colonies. While it is true the colonists branded
as unconstitutional statutes which provided that persons committing
crimes in the colonies might be tried in England, it should be noted that
this contention was not directed to the English venue statutes which
regulated the place of trial of crimes committed in England.
The principal trial court of Michigan Territory was the territorial
Supreme Court established by Congress in 1805.101 This court had
jurisdiction of two general classes of cases: ( 1) territorial cases, that is,
cases such as might be tried in ordinary state courts; (2) United States
cases, described as cases which concerned the United States.102 The
court was the chief trial court for territorial jury cases from 1805 to
1825 and during this period had exclusive jurisdiction of capital cases.
100

Id., 43 Mich. at 449.
Stat. L. 309 ( I 80 5). This act established for Michigan Territory a government "in all respects similar" to that provided for the Northwest Territory by the
Ordinance of 1787.
102 See l TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, 1805-1814, (Vol. 1 of University of Michigan Legal Publications), edited by
W. W. Blume, pp. xlvii-xlix (1935).
101 2
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From r805 to r823 its original jurisdiction over these cases extended
throughout the territory, which, after r8r8, reached as far west as the
Mississippi riyer. After r823 this jurisdiction was limited to the area
east of Lake Michigan. The Supreme Court was the chief trial court
for United States cases throughout the entire territorial period (18051836). This jurisdiction extended to civil and criminal cases and
reached all parts of the territory. From 1834 the western boundary of
the territory was the Missouri and White Earth rivers. This extensive
jurisdiction, of both territorial and United States cases, was exercised
only in Wayne County at Detroit-the territorial capital.108
In 182r one Ke-wa-bish-kim was indicted for murder by a grand
jury "in and for the body of the Territory of Michigan" impaneled by
the Supreme Court sitting as a territorial court at Detroit.104 The indictment charged the defendant, "an Indian of the Menomini tribe,"
with having murdered Charles Ulrich "at Green Bay, in the County
of Brown, in the Territory of Michigan." After a trial at Detroit in
which the defendant was found guilty, his attorney moved in arrest
of judgment assigning as one of the grounds the following:
"First for that the same Ke-wa-bish-kim was not arraigned,
tried and convicted for the said alleged murder, within the Body
of the proper County, where such offence is charged to have been
committed, to wit, the County of Brown aforesaid, as was his, the
said Ke-wa-bish-kim's Just and acquired right so to be, according
with the Common Law of England, as guaranteed to him, the
said Ke-wa-bish-kim, in common with every other individual
within this Territory, ... contravening or obstructing such right
so acquired as aforesaid to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.
He the said Ke-wa-bish-kim protesting, that the said Legislature
of said Territory were not invested with any authority or power
to enact, adopt, or provide any Law depriving him of such right,
so as aforesaid acquired and described ..." 105
This motion was overruled and the_ defendant executed.
In the same year (r82r) one Ke-taw-kah was indicted for murder
by a grand jury impaneled at Detroit by the Supreme Court sitting as
a circuit and district court of the United States.106 The indictment
charged that the murder had been committed within the United States
and the territory of Michigan, and within a district to which the Indian
title had not been extinguished. The place of the murder was outside
108

See 5 id., 1825-1836; pp. xii-xxxii.

105

104

3 id., 1814-1824, pp. 147.

106

Ibid. at 633.
Ibid. at 494.
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Wayne County-the county in which the trial was held. According to
a newspaper account of the trial, an attorney _for the defendant challenged the array: 101
"3. Because they are not brought from the county or country
where it is alleged the crime was committed. We have a right to
a jury from the vicinage.
"Witherell-the U.S. law provides that the jury shall be got
according to the practice of the highest court of law in the territory, &c. This jury has been so summoned. The challenge ought
not to be sustained.
"Woodward-Agreed with Witherell. The offence is not
charged in any county of the territory. The jury may therefore
come from any county.
"Challenge disallowed."
The defendant in this case was convicted and executed.
In 1822 one James Homer was indicted and tried at Detroit for
the alleged murder of James G~lloway, a soldier at Green Bay.108 In
this case the defendant was acquitted.
In 1829 a criminal prosecution for "trespass on the lands of Winnebago Indians" was commenced at Detroit before the Supreme· Court
sitting as a circuit and district court of the United States.100 The lands
alleged to have been invaded were "situated upon and adjacent to the
Ouisconsin River." Judge Woodbridge thought a venire, instead of
the usual capias or bench warrant, should be issued for two reasons: 110
"Second: Because there is an appearance of great severitynot sought to be accounted for, in attempting to bring the Defts.
thro' the wilderness ( for the Attorney knows that all navigation
is at an end until next Summer) more perhaps than 1000 miles
round the South extreme of Lake Michigan,-when in their very
neighborhood, there is a Court which confessedly has a jurisdiction
concurrent in this matter with that, this Court has!
"I feel it matter of duty to entertain cognizance of this case,
since the Attorney for the Govt. requires it, but I cannot avoid
remarking, that no reason has been suggested why these men are
not proceeded against in the County where they reside and where
the witnesses doubtless are, or in the immediate vicinity of the
Indian Territory-I mean in the Court of the Upper District."
After these remarks the information was withdrawn.
101
108

Ibid at 496.
Ibid. at 248.

109
110

5 id., 1825-1836, pp. 384.
Ibid. at 386-387.
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While not applicable to states, the jury provisions of the Federal
Constitution were applicable to incorporated territories. The vicinage
and venue provisions, however, were not applicable, as the Constitution
expressly provides that when a crime is "not committed within any
State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places, as the Congress maJ
by law have directed." m_ Acting under the Constitution; Congress
established one superior trial court with an "undivided jurisdiction,
thro and over the whole Territory." 112 Although this broad territorial jurisdiction was gradually cut down by Congress and by the
territorial legislature acting under authority given by Congress, it is
entirely clear that the territorial extent of the court's jurisdiction was
regulated by statute. The jury guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
to the people of the territory was not a jury of the "county" but of
such "place or places" as Congress might provide.
The peoples of the early territories looked upon the Ordinance of
1787 as their "constitution." The ordinance declared that .the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory should always be entitled to the
. benefits of "trial by jury" and of "judicial proceedings according to
· the course of the common law." 113 The ordinance further provided
that no man should be "deprived of his liberty or property, but by
the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." That these guaranties did not include trial by a jury of the county is indicated by the
fact that the ordinance established one trial court for the entire territory
without stating how or where it should exercise its jurisdiction. The
fact that the governor and judges of the territory provided in 1788
"that all processes, civil and criminal, shall be returnable to said court
wheresoever they may be in said territory," but that "all issues of fact
shall be tried in the county where the cause of action shall have
arisen," 114 shows that the first officers of the ·Northwest Territory
understood that the matter of venue had been left to them for regulation. That this was the view of the Supreme Court of Michigan Territory is shown by the decisions referred to above. It may be noted that
the Ordinance of 1787 was adopted in the same year the Constitution
of the United. States was drafted, and was, therefore, a product of
the body of thought which produced that Constitution and the early
constitutions of the original states.
111

Billingsley v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 178 F. 653 at 657.

112 I TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN,

1814-1824, p. 459•
, ·
113 1 Stat. L. 51 at 52 (1802), note.
114 N. W. Terr. Laws, 1788-1800, (Pease, 1925) p.
Reprint}.

.
II

(Illinois State Bar Assn
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Without reviewing further the "previous jurispmdence" of the
state of Michigan, enough has been indicated to show that Justice
Cooley was wrong in assuming that the jury known to the "previous
jurisprudence" of the state was a jury of the county. The right to
jury trial enjoyed by the people of Michigan Territory was the right
established by the Constitution of the United States. And this is true
of all states organizep. from territories of the United States. In providing that trial by jury shall remain, the :first constitutions of these
states guaran~eed to the peoples of the states the same trial by jury
as had been guaranteed to the peoples of the territories by the Federal
Constitution.
·
Turning to the period since Swart v. Kimball, we :find the case is
still authority in Michigan, although the rule announced by it has been
modified to some extent. As recently as 1940 _a statute which made it
unlawful to possess certain :fish and also provided that possession should
remain in a shipper of such :fish until delivered to the consignee was
held unconstitutional insofar as it authorized a prosecution in a county
through which the shipment passed. 115 A majority of the.judges condemned "constructive crimes" and relied heavily on the opinion of
Justice Cooley in Swart v. Kimball. An earlier statute which provided
that a person charged with larceny from a railroad car while en route
within the state might be prosecuted in any county through which the
car passed was held unconstitutional in 1907.116 A statute which authorized the prosecution of certain embezzlements in the county where
the complainant's principal place of business might be was held wiconstitutional in 1883.117 In this case Justice Campbell said:
"· .. it cannot be seriously claimed that the prosecution can be
had in a county where the crime was not actually or in contemplation of law perpetrated. The constitutional guaranty on this su~
ject is too plain to be controverted." 118
In 1884 Justice Champlin noted that the requirement that jurors
"shall reside in the vicinage" has always "been associated with the
jury system in criminal cases in the jurisprudence of both England
and America, and is as essential as that the number shall consist of
twelve." 119
115

People v. Olson, 293 Mich. 514, 292 N. W. 860 (1940).
People v. Brock, 149 Mich. 464, 112 N. W. 1116 (1907).
117
Hill v. Taylqr, 50 Mich. 549, 15 N. W. 899 (1883).
118
Id., 50 Mich. at 551. ,
119
People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 48· at 53, 18 N. W. 555 (1884).
116
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The first case which indicated any tendency to depart from the
rule laid down by Justice Cooley was People v. Peterson,120 decided in
l 892. The defendant was tried in Menominee County for a crime
alleged to have been committed in Delta County, after two juries had
disagreed in the latter county. After quoting the provisions of the
constitution, Justice Long said:121
"It will be observed that our Constitution contains no express
provision as to the place of trial of offenders, as do the constttutions of some of the other states. . . . We think it is well settled
that, where there is no constitutional provision fixing the vicinage
within which the trial must be had, the rule of the common law,
[ allowing a change of venue] must prevail, unless changed by
statute, and that under their common-law powers the circuit courts
have the right, upon cause shown, to change the venue upon the
application of the people."
The same result was reached in People v. Fuhrmann,1 22 decided in
1895.
In Andrews v. Ellsworth,123 decided in 1916, a question was raised
as to the constitutionality of a statute which had provided that the
counties on the shore of Lake Huron snould have jurisdiction "in
common:" of all offenses which might be committed on the part of
the lake which was within the limits of the state and that such offenses
might be prosecuted in any of said counties. While recognizing a constitutional right to a jury of the vicinage, the court held that the
legislature may fix the boundaries of a vicinage. In announcing' this
significant conclusion Justice Bird said:
" ... While the general rule is that the county is the vicinage,
there are some exceptions thereto where justice demands it. Illustration of this is seen in the exception to the rule giving to the
adjoining counties of the State concurrent jurisdiction of offenses
committed on and within IOO rods of the boundary lirie between
them....
·
"Another exception to the rule is the statute providing for the
change of venue; this is an enlargement of the vicinage in the intere~t of the administration of justice. The fixing of the boundaries
of a vicinage is a legislative function." 124
120

93 Mich. 27, 52 N. W. 1039 (1892).
Id., 93 Mich. at 29-30.
l'22 103 Mich. 593, 61 N. W. 865 (1895).
123
190 Mich. 157, 156 N. W. 115 (1916).
124
Id., 190 Mich. at 161, also see People v. Donaldson, 243 Mich. 104, 219
N. W. 602 (1928), which involved the statute authorizing trial in either county when
121
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If the Supreme Court of Michigan will follow this decision instead of
S'lqart v. Kimball, the shackles placed on the hands of the legislature
by the erroneous decision in the latter case, will in part be removed.
Justice Connor of the Supreme Court of North Carolin~ concurred
"with much hesitation" in the views of that court "that the venue of
offenses cognizable before any grand jury is a matter of legislative
enactment." m Looking back at the case after three years of further
consideration, he wrote:126
" ... The question of legislative power is a.n op'en one in our
jurisprudence, the Court holding one view in Michigan and an
opposite one in North Carolina. It would seem that the trend of
judicial thought is with the Michigan Court and that historically
the latter Court has enunciated the sounder Constitutional doctrine."
One purpose of the present paper is to show that "historically" the
decision of the Michigan court is not sound. Another purpose is to
show that "the trend of judicial thought," as reflected py cases since
Justice Connor wrote in 1909, is not toward the position taken by the
Michigan court in Swart v. Kimball, but distinctly the other way.

B. Indefinite Provisions
Some of the cases decided since I 909 which show the present "trend
of judicial thou:ght" will be found in the seven states 121 which have
indefinite vicinage and venue provisions. As we have seen already,
recent cases in Vir01nia 128 Pennsylvania 129 Maine 180 and Vermont131
o•
'
'
'
reveal an unwillingness on the part of the courts to read into ·vague
and general provisions of the constitutions a definite requirement that
crimes be tried in the counties where committed. These cases, coupled
a crime is committed on or within 100 rods of boundary. In People v. Richards, 247
Mich. 608, 226 N. W. 651 (1929) the court held that a convict may be tried in the
county in which the penitentiary is located, although the crime (an escape) was committed in another county. Mr. Justice Fellows, dissenting, relied on Swart v. Kimball.
125
State v. Lewis, 142 N. C. 492 at 499, 55 S. E. 600 (1906).
126
Connor, "The Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage," 57
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 197 at 213 (1909).
127
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia.
128
Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S. E. 562 (1919), discussed at
note 41, supra.
129
Commonwealth v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, 110 A. 738 (1920) and Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 A. 574 (1936), discussed at note 42 and 44, supra.
180
State v. Longley, 119 Me. 535, II2 A. 260 (1921), discussed at note 71,
supra.
181
State v. Brown, 103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579 (1931), discussed at note 74, supra.
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with the early view to the same effect in Massachusetts 132 and silence
in Maryland, show a remarkable degree of unanimity of opinion .on
theI part of the courts in the eastern group of states. If these courts
are unwilling to read into an indefinite vicinage or venue provision a
definite requirement that crimes be tried in the counties where committed, a f ortiorari they will be unwilling to read such a requirement
into the still more gener;al guaranty that trial by jury shall remain.
When both constitutional provisions were urged upon the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in 1920 the court brushed the second aside as
unworthy of serious consideration.188
In the group of states not formed from the Colonies the constitutions of at least five have, at one time or another, provided for a jury
of the "vicinage." 134 In three of these states the indefinite provisions
have been made definite; in one (Michigan) the indefinite provision
has been taken out; while in one (Kentucky) the indefinite provision
is still in force. 185
In 1891 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the vicinage
provision of the constitution was not intended to prohibit the legislature
from providing by a general law for a change' of venue upon application by the commonwealth.186 Later in the. same year (1891) the
constitutional provision was rewritten and the following~ added: "but
the General Assembly may provide by a general law for a change of
venue in such prosecutions for both the defendant and the Commonwealth, the change to be made to the most convenient county in which
a fair trial can be obtained." 137 But for the decision of the court of
appeals, the conferring of express authority on the legislature to provide for change of venue would indicate that the constitution makers
thought such power would not otherwise exist because of the vicinage
provisiqn of the constitution.
Referring in 1922 to statutes authorizing a trial in eith~r county
when it is doubtful in which of two counties a crime was committed and
when a wound is inflicted in one county and death occurs in another,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hurt,
said:1ss
132
Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 549 (1824), discussed at note
31, supra.
183
Commonwealth v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295, 110 A. 738 (1920), discussed at
note 42, supra.
.
134 Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Illinois, Louisiana. See supra, pp., 78-79.
185 Ky. Const. (1891) § I I ; originally Ky. Const. (1792) art. 12.
136
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 91 _Ky. 162, 15 S. W. 53 (1891).
137
Ky. Const. (1891), Bill of Rights,§ II.
138
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 699 at 703, 240 S. W. 750 (1922).
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"These statutes have been held not violative of section 11 of
the Constitution, as the language therein providing that an offender shall be tried by a jury of the vicinage means a jury in the
neighborhood of the place of the commission of the crime, .or such
part of it as may have occurred in the county."
From these and other cases 139 it appears that each time a venue statute
has been attacked in Kentucky, its constitutionality has been sustained.

C. Provisions for Trial by Jury of or in the "County or District''
The provision found in the constitutions of twelve states 140 that in
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the "county or district" in which the o:ffense is alleged
to have beeen committed does not appear in any of the early constitutions of the original states. It is obvious that it was borrowed from the '
Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which amendment was
finally ratified in 1791.141 The words "state and district" used in the
Federal Amendment become "county or district" in the constitutions
of the states. The word "district" as used in the Federal Constitution
means federal judicial district; what it means in the state constitutions
is not entirely clear.
In 1878 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the word "district"
as used in the constitution of that state does not mean judicial district,
but "is convertible with that of 'county."' 142 In 1884 the court nullified a statute which authorized the trial of a crime committed within
• one hundred rods of the line between two counties in either county,
insofar as it authorized trial in one county of a crime committed entirely
within another county. 143 In 1888, however, the court upheld as constitutional a statute which authorized the trial of a crime committed on
a railroad train,'in any county through which the train passed. The
constitution in force in 188 8 insured the right to an impartial jury of
189

Commonwealth v. Jones, I I 8 Ky. 889, 82 S. W. 643 ( I 904); Hargis v.
Parker, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 441, 85 S. W. 704 (1905). In the latter case at 444 the
court said: "It has always been understood that the right to trial by a 'jury of the
vicinage' was subject to certain necessary exceptions, such as change of venue, and the
like." In Commonwealth v. Jones, I I 8 Ky. at 894, the court said: " .•• the matter
turns upon the meaning of the term, 'jury of the vicinage.' Literally it signifies of the
neighborhood where the crime was committed. The purpose of the requirement is to
insure a person charged with crime against being transported to a distant locality for
trial.'' See also Baxter v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 204, 166 S. W. (2d) 24 (1942).
140 Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, South Dako.ta, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming.,
141 See note 19, supra.
m Weyrich v. People, 89 Ill. 90 at 94 (1878).
143
Buckrice v. People, l 10 Ill. 29 (1884).
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the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. After finding an unsuspected meaning in the words "is alleged," the court, in an opinion by Justice Bailey, said:m
"While at common law and by the rule established by both
our former constitutions criminal offenses were regarded as strictly
local, and subject to prosecution only in the counties where they
were committed, our present constitution vests in the General
Assembly the power to change that rule to such extent as it may
see proper."
In 1881 the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the word "district" does not refer to "judicial district" nor is it synonomous with
"county," but means "trial" or "jury" district.145 The court held, also,
"that the legislature may, in their discretion, by a general law create
trial districts which shall include more territory than a single county." 146 The Supreme Court of Kansas has said "the word 'district'
like the word 'county' is here used in a restrictive sense, and is intended
to designate' the precise portion of territory or division of the state
over which a court at any particular sitting may exercise power in
criminal matters." 141 In 1888 the Kansas court held that venue may
not be changed from one judicial district to another without the consent of the accused, thus indicating that "district" means "judicial
district." 148 The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in 1918, after citing
cases decided by the courts of Illinois,149 Nebraska,uo Kansas,m South
Dakota,152 and Wisconsin,153 said:
144

Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9 at 18-19, 18 N. E. 340 (1888).
Olive v. State, II N~b. 1, 7 N. W. ,444 (1881). Also see State ex rel. Scott
v. Crinklaw, 40 Neb. 759, 59 N. W. 370 (1894).
146
Olive v. State, II Neb. l at 14, 7 N. W. 444 (1881).
147
State v. Bunker, 38 Kan. 737 at 741-742, 17 P. 651 (1888).
148
State v. Knapp, 40 Kan. 148, 19 P. 728 (1888).
149
Wattv. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N. E. 340 (1888), supra, note 141.
150
Olive v. State, I I Neb. 1, 7 N. W. 444 (1881), supra, note 142.
151
State v. Bunker, 38 Kan. 737, 17 P. 651 (1888), supra, note 144.
152
ln re Nelson, 19 S. D. 214, 102 N. W. 885 (1902). Referring to the constitutional provision the court said, 19 S. D. at 221: "There is nothing uncertain or
ambiguous in this language, except, perhaps, the use of the word 'district,' which has
uniformly been construed to mean the trial district, or territory from yvhich the jury
is summoned."
153
State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 at 596, 19 N. W. 429 (1884).·
" ••. the words 'or district,' as used in this clause of the constitution, were intended
by the framers of that instrument: and understood by all at the time, to mean something different than the word 'country' as therein used; especially when taken in connection with the words 'which county or district shall have been previously ascertained
by law.' From this, it appears to be competent for the legislature to change the bound145

1 944]

VENUE OF CRIMINAL CASES

91

"We agree with those courts holding that the word 'district'
cannot be considered as superfluous, and that, being used in conjunction with the word 'county' it means trial district." m
Whether in New Mexico a trial district may include more than one
county does not appear.
It has been observed that a constitution requiring a jury of the
"county or district" is "generally regarded as not so closely restricting
the legislative power" as one which requires a jury of the "county." m
The writers making this observation were discussing the constitutionality of statutes which auth9rize trial in either county when a
crime is committed within a specified distance of the line between
two counties.us
D. Provisions for Trial by Jury of or in the "County" or "Parish"
As pointed out above, sixteen states have constitutions which require
trial in, or jury from, the "county" ( or, in Louisiana, "parish") in
which the crime was committed. Of this number eight require trial
"in the county," 151 while eight require a jury "of the county." m
Historically and theoretically there is a substantial difference between the two types of provision-between vicinage and venue. Where
the jury must be of the "county" of the crime, it would seem that the
legislature has power to fix the place of trial in any county so long as
the jurors or some of them are summoned from the county in which
the crime is committed. I say "some of them" because at common law
it was not necessary to summon all the jurors from the hundred in
which the crime was committed. According to Hale, four hundredors were enough.150, Practically, however, this measure of legislative
aries of the districts without changing the boundaries of the counties." See also State
v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869).
164
State v. Balles, 24 N. M. 16, 172 P. 196 (1918). See also State v. Archer,
32 N. M. 319,255 P. 396 (1927).
156
Note by M.A.G. in 25 ILL. L. REv. 732 at 733 (1931); note by A.B.S. in
76 A.L.R. 1034 at 1040 (1932)
166
The cases cited by these writers show that the validity of such statutes has been
passed on in states having the three types of constitutional provisions ,iS follows:
Constitutional Unconstitutional
Indefinite provisions
3
1
"County'' or "district"
3
2
"County" or "parish'
I
6
In states having no express vicinage or venue provision this type of statute has been
held constitutional in two; enforced without question in two; and held invalid in none.
157
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina,
West Virginia.
158
Arizona, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington.
159
Supra at note 4.
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power is of no significance. Whether the trial must be in the county
or by a jury from the county, the problem of determining in which
county the crime was committed is the same. If the object is to get
away from local prejudices, the summoning of jurors from the county
where the prejudices exist will be of little value. From the standpoint of convenience, the transporting of jurors to another county·is
undesirable and was, in the early days of the common law, a cause
of much co.rp.plaint. The tendency in modern law is to think of the
place of trial rather than the place from which the jury must be
summoned. From vicinage to venue has been the pattern of develppment, and the transition is about complete.
While the hands of the legislatures are closely tied by both types
of provision, in a few states the bonds have been loosened enough to
permit some legislative activity. In Oregon, for instance, the supreme
court, in I 929, sustained a statute which provides that when a crime
is committed within one mile of the boundary line of two counties,
the accused may be tried in either.160 In answer to an argument "that
if the legislature can extend the jurisdiction one mile from the boundary line" it may extend it "twenty or thirty miles," the court said:
"It will be time enough to meet that question when it arises. It is
sufficient to say that designation by the legislature of the one-mile
- strip. . . • is not an unreasonable exercise of legislative discretion." 161
In Florida, for another instance, the supreme court has sustained a
statute authorizing a change of venue without the consent of the accused, but "only when it is impossible to secure an impartial jury in
the county where the crime was committed.m62 Taken altogether,
however, the states having these narrow vicinage and venue provisions
in their constitutions do not have satisfactory venue statutes, and cannot have them until this unfortunate constitutional limitation is removed.

IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The constitutions of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
1ao State v. Lehman, 130 Ore. 132, 279 P. 283 (1929) noted in 9 ORE. L. REV•.
395 (1930).
161 ld., 130 Ore. at 137-138.
•
1a2 Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26 at 3i, · IOI So. 233 (1924). See also
''Validity of a Statute Granting the State Change of Venue in a Criminal Trial," 17
IowA L. REv. 399 (1932). For recent developments in Louisiana see Litton, "The
Resurrection and Constitutionality of a Liberal Criminal Venue Statute," 4 LA. L. REV.
321 (1942).
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North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas do not refer, in express
terms, to either vicinage or venue. In these states, with the notable
exception of Michigan, the venue of criminal cases is a matter of unrestricted statutory regulation. If states as large as California, New
York, and Texas have gotten along without a constitutional limitation,
one wonders why such protection is needed in smaller states.
The constitutions of Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia either require a jury of the
"vicinage," "country," or "vicinity," or merely declare it essential to
try facts where they arise. In these states the courts have shown a
tendency to hold that trial in, or a jury of, the county where the crime
was committed is not required. Venue in criminal cases is largely, if
not entirely, under legislative control.
The constitutions of Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming require that criminal cases be tried by a jury of
the "county or district" in which the crime is alleged to have been
committed. In these states the prevailing view is that "district" means
"trial district" and that the legislature has power to .establish such
districts. This power, however, is not broad enough to authorize the
establishment of a truly rational venue system based on convenience.
In Illinois the legislature may determine what o:ffenses are to be
deemed local and what transitory.
The constitutions of Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia· provide for
trial "in the county" ( or, in Louisiana, the "parish"), while the constitutions of Arizona, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington require a jury "of the county,"
in which the crime was committed. In these states the legislatures are
without power to regulate the venue of criminal cases except within
counties and their attempts to do so have been, in almost every instance,
nullified by the courts.
The Constitution of the United States requires trial in the '~state"
and by a jury of the "state and district" in which the crime was committed. Trial in, or by a jury of, the "county" is not required. The
jury guaranteed to the people of the various territories was not a jury
of the "county" but a jury to be selected from such places as the legislative authority might provide.
Of the constitutions of the fifteen states formed from the original
colonies, only three require trial in the county of the crime. The other
twelve either make no provision for vicinage or venue, or do so in
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vague and general language. The tendency in constitution writing
has been to make narrow and definite what, at the time of the adoption
of the first constitutions, had purposely been left broad and indefinite.
It is the writer's view that this tendency has been unfortunate and was
due to a misunderstanding of the historical background of the early
constitutions.
In the course of this paper reference has been made to some fourteen different types of venue statute challenged as unconstitutional.
Most of these statutes have been held invalid in one state or another.
The passage of these statutes shows a need for a system of venue more
flexible than that provided by the narrow constitutions. One of the
- latest needs is a statute to take care of the venue of crimes committed
in or against aircraft while in :flight.-163 This and other statutes recommended by the American Law Institute 164 should be adopted.
The writer believes, with Stephan, that the place of trial of criminal
cases should be determined by "the convenience of the court, the
witnesses, and the person accused." 165 A statute designed to put into
operation the principle of convenience should direct that crimes be
prosecuted in certain counties, and then should authorize the court in
which the prosecution is commenced to change the venue to the county
most convenient for all concerned. By making an order for change
of venue immediately reviewable by the highest court of appeal, all
danger of unfairness in fixing the place of the trial would disappear.
· This type of statute should be held constitutional in the twenty
states· whose constitutions either have no express vicinage or venue
provision or have o:nly vague and indefinite provisions on the subject.
In the twelve states whose constitutions require trial by jury of the
"county or district" of the crime, it is possible, but unlikely, that the
word "district" will be interpreted to mean the place most convenient
for trial. In these states, except Illinois, and in the sixteen whose
constitutions require trial in, or by a jury of, the "county" where the
crime was committed, the constitutional limitations on the powers of
legislatures and courts with respect to venue should be removed.
1158

16

See· note in 10 A1R L. REv. 303 (1939).

* Code of Criminal Procedure; Official Draft, p. 100 (1930). Digests of con-

stitutional and statutory provisions will
1155
Note 56 supra.

be found on pp. 688-692 and 694-718.

